"Feint A ack", as a new type of APT a ack, has become the focus of a ention. It adopts a multi-stage a acks mode which can be concluded as a combination of virtual a acks and real a acks. Under the cover of virtual a acks, real a acks can achieve the real purpose of the a acker, as a result, it o en caused huge losses inadvertently. However, to our knowledge, all previous works use common methods such as Causal-Correlation or Cased-based to detect outdated multi-stage a acks. Few a entions have been paid to detect the "Feint A ack", because the di culty of detection lies in the diversi cation of the concept of "Feint A ack" and the lack of professional datasets, many detection methods ignore the semantic relationship in the a ack. Aiming at the existing challenge, this paper explores a new method to solve the problem. In the a ack scenario, the fuzzy clustering method based on a ribute similarity is used to mine multi-stage a ack chains. en we use a few-shot deep learning algorithm (SMOTE&CNN-SVM) and bidirectional Recurrent Neural Network model (Bi-RNN) to obtain the "Feint A ack" chains. "Feint A ack" is simulated by the real a ack inserted in the normal causal a ack chain, and the addition of the real a ack destroys the causal relationship of the original a ack chain. So we used Bi-RNN coding to obtain the hidden feature of "Feint A ack" chain. In the end, our method achieved the goal to detect the "Feint A ack" accurately by using the LLDoS1.0 and LLDoS2.0 of DARPA2000 and CICIDS2017 of Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity.
INTRODUCTION
Under the background of the rapid development of global network informationization, the hidden, pervasive and targeted Advanced Persistent reat (APT) poses a growing threat to various highlevel information security systems [15] . APT a acks are increasing which target to national and enterprise network information systems and data security face severe challenges. In March 2011, at the 6th International Conference on Information Warfare and Security (ICIW), three security researchers at Lockheed Martin proposed an Intrusion Kill Chain (IKC) [4] . From the perspective of intrusion detection, they decompose the a ack process into seven steps: reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control (C2), and actions on objectives. is model rede nes the kill chain in the military eld to cyberspace security, providing us with new ideas for solving APT a acks [21] [9] .
However, at the end of 2017, Trend Micro pointed out that there has been a new type of APT a ack named "Feint A ack" [10] . It not only uses the same a ack, but also makes full use of two separate malware a acks. One a ack (Virtual a ack) is responsible for distracting and masking the malicious activity of another a ack (Real a ack) to provide a way to further infect or steal data and intellectual property. Enterprise IT Security Risk Survey Report pointed out that the above-mentioned virtual a acks are o en distributed denial of service (DDoS) a acks [5] . rough analysis of security experts, these DDoS a acks are only "smoke bombs" that a acks use to cover their real a acks. Some enterprises that have su ered DDoS a acks nding that DDoS a acks are only part of the overall network a ack, accounting for only 29% of the total a ack time. When a DDoS a ack occurs, the enterprise's security department must try to quickly restore normal access services because the normal external access of the enterprise is denied or interrupted.
erefore, during the DDoS a ack, security departments are o en required to go all out to solve the DDoS a ack problem, and then the a acker "make a feint to the east but a ack in the west" and cannot take into account the other intrusion. A er the "Feint Attack", 25% of companies will lose important data at the same time.
As it turns out, in order to improve the e ciency of a ackers, an a acker o en launches a variety of other forms of a ack when launching a DDoS a ack. erefore, once a company is found to be a acked by DDoS, it must understand the full threat situation and be ready to handle multiple types of network a acks, otherwise it is likely to su er greater losses. e Trend Micro report predicted that such a acks will become more common in 2018.
e "Feint A ack" mode has received extensive a ention in the eld of cyberspace security. However, in the face of special a acks, how to carry out related detection and defense work is still a problem. e detection of multi-stage a ack mode at home and abroad is currently in the key research stage. is paper mainly focuses on the special a ack mode of "Feint A ack", and proposes a detection model based on fuzzy clustering in alert correlation and Bi-RNN algorithm. e main contributions are as follows:
(1) Replaying the tra c packet of the LLDoS 1.0 and LLDoS2.0 of DARPA2000 intrusion detection a ack scenario [14] and the tra c packet (.pcap) of Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset (CICIDS2017) [7] [20] through snort, generating the raw alert data, further based on the ve-tuple (A ackType, S IP, D IP, S Port, D Port) performs alert aggregation. e main purpose is to reduce the duplicate alert data of the same a ack event, and use the fuzzy clustering based on a ribute similarity to process the raw alert a er aggregation. Multi-stage a ack chains are mined in the a ack scenario to form a multi-stage a ack mode comparison library.
(2) We improved the traditional deep learning algorithm, CI-CIDS2017 dataset in our experiment is preprocessed by the imbalanced learning strategy. We used the deep convolutional neural network to learn the new feature representation of the dataset. en the few-shot learning is performed by the hierarchical SVM classi er. e classi cation result was de ned and divided the virtual a acks and real a acks with the con dence level. Finally, we constructed the dataset of virtual a acks and real a acks, which is the basic element library of the "Feint A ack" chain. (3) Using the multi-stage a ack and element a ack event library obtained in the rst and second stages, our method of a ack chain recovery technology based on Bi-RNN. According to the method, "Feint A ack" is simulated by the real a ack inserted in the normal causal a ack chain, and the addition of the real a ack destroys the causal relationship of the original a ack chain. e hidden feature is obtained by Bi-RNN coding. Further we classi ed the two types of trainable samples. Finally, our work achieved the purpose of detecting the "Feint A ack" accurately. e structure of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will discuss the related work in this eld. Section 3 will present "Feint A ack" chains construction and detection methods through "Feint A ack" chains model. Section 4 gives experimental and results. Finally, conclusion is showed in Section 5.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the related work about approaches that detect multi-stage a acks using IDS alerts. Generally, the approaches may be classi ed into two categories, namely causal correlation analysis and cluster correlation analysis.
Causal Correlation Analysis e causal alert correlation method associates the alert information according to the causal dependence between the a acks. If the result of one a ack behavior creates a precondition for another a ack behavior, it is considered that there is a causal dependence between the two a ack behaviors, and the causal relationship is utilized. Nguyen et al. [16] conducted an empirical game analysis of the multi-stage interaction between the a acker and the defender to obtain a heuristic strategy under the Bayesian a ack graph model. Haas et al. [8] proposed a graph-based alert association (GAC) algorithm to isolate a acks and identify a ack scenarios, and assemble multi-stage a acks from a large set of alerts. Pei et al. [17] proposed a method which model multi-stage intrusion analysis as a community discovery problem analysis system, and discovers any "a ack communities" embedded within the graphs. A novel method based on the Hidden Markov Model is proposed to predict multi-stage a acks using IDS alerts by Holgado et al. [11] ey consider the hidden states as similar phases of a particular type of a ack. Katipally et al. [12] use data mining to process alarms and input the processed data into the hidden Markov model (HMM), ultimately achieving the purpose of analyzing and predicting the behavior of the a acker.
Cluster Correlation Analysis e clustering alert correlation method associates alert information with some identical or similar features, that is, clustering by the similarity between alert a ribute values, such as the same destination address, the same a ack source, a ack means, etc. Ahmadianramaki et al. [1] proposed a three-layer processing framework that uses causal knowledge to correlate alerts, automatically extracts causal relationships between alerts, builds the a ack scenario using Bayesian networks. And further predict the most likely next a ack behavior. Barzegar et al. [3] proposed approach reconstructs a ack scenarios by reasoning based on the evidences in the alert stream.
e main idea of the proposed approach is to identify the causal relation between alerts using their similarity. Alvarenga et al. [2] approach applies process mining techniques on alerts to extract information regarding the a ackers behavior and the multi-stage a ack strategies they adopted. e strategies are presented to the network administrator in friendly high-level visual models. Large and visually complex models that are di cult to understand are clustered into smaller, simpler and intuitive models using hierarchical clustering techniques.
Bidirectional RNN RNN is used in the eld of natural language processing and its main purpose is to process and predict sequence data [13] . e neural network memorizes the previous information, stores it in the internal state of the network, and applies it to the calculation of the current output, that is, the nodes between the hidden layers are no longer connected but connected, and the hidden layer e input contains not only the output of the input layer but also the output of the hidden layer at the previous moment. In the classical cyclic neural network, the state of the transmission is one-way from the back. e bidirectional RNN [18] can memorize and encode the context information, and the subject structure is the combination of two unidirectional RNNs. At each time t, the input is provided to both RNNs in opposite directions, and the output is determined by the two unidirectional RNNs (which can be spliced or summed, etc.). In this paper, the Bi-RNN algorithm is introduced into the coding part of the multi-stage a ack sequence. In the multi-stage a ack scenario, an a ack chain can be analogized into a sequence. Each atomic a ack is equivalent to one word. By encoding the a ack sequence through Bi-RNN, the causal association of the a ack sequence can be preserved to the greatest extent, and achieve the goal of reducing the dimension.
e multi-stage a ack detection based on causal correlation requires a large amount of expert knowledge to support, and the acquisition of expert knowledge is very di cult, and can not discover new a ack behavior. In this paper, the fuzzy clustering method based on a ribute similarity is used to mine the multi-stage a ack mode.
e previous work of detection of the multi-stage a ack chain does not consider the special type of "Feint A ack" chain, and the length of the constructed a ack chain is too long, which makes it di cult to retain its inherent causal relationship in further analysis and pre-processing. erefore, our research is based on previous work. It mainly achieve the goal of de ning and dividing virtual a acks and real a acks, builds the a ack chain based on causal correlation and Bi-RNN model, further obtains the trainable a ack sample set, and nally obtains the a ack chain detection classi er through training.
"FEINT ATTACK" CHAINS CONSTRUCTION AND DETECTION METHOD
In order to achieve the "Feint A ack" chain detection based on the virtual a ack chain and real a ack chain, we try to solve the problem through proposed new detection method in this section which mainly utilizes fuzzy clustering and Bi-RNN algorithm. e input to our model is raw data stream ( e packet format is .dump and .pcap) of LLDoS1.0 and LLDoS2.0 of DARPA2000 and CICIDS2017 of Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity, and the output is the result of the classi er for detect "Feint A ack". at is, whether there is a "Feint A ack" behavior in a multi-stage a ack sequence. We will describe in detail the implementation of each algorithm proposed in this paper, and show how to achieve our model to construct and detect the "Feint A ack" chain. Framework of bidirectional RNN based few-shot training for detecting multi-stage a ack model is shown in Figure 1 . Using the captured real-time data packet or replaying the classical a ack dataset by snort to obtain the raw alerts. e multi-stage a ack mode is mined by the fuzzy clustering method based on a ribute similarity, and the virtual a ack and real a ack are dened and divided by the few-shot deep learning model [6] . e real a ack is embedded into the a ack chain by Bi-RNN coding, and the "Feint A ack" chain is constructed. Further we classi ed the two types of trainable samples. Finally, our work achieved the purpose of detecting the "Feint A ack" accurately. 
Alert Correlation Based on Fuzzy
Clustering
IDS alert is a kind of alert generated when a ack operations occur. It shows security situation of the entire network. We represent IDS alert as alert = a 1 , a 2 , ...a n , where a i indicates the i th alert and is a nine-tuple:
Raw alert refers to a single a ack action performed by the a acker in the network. It may be an alarm generated directly by the IDS system a er the scan of the host service or the exploitation of a vulnerability of the host, without any processing.
D
3. An a ack sequence is a sequence of IDS alerts that is produced by an a acking process. We represent the a ack sequence as AS = {a 1 , a 2 , ...a n }.
Alert Aggregation
We found that there are many a ack type, source IP, destination IP, source port and destination port with the same or similar alerts in a certain time window, which are recorded as ve-tuple (AttackT pe, S IP, D IP, S Port, D Port). According to the speci c circumstances of the alert, this paper is divided into the following modes: a) (AttackT pe, S IP, D IP, S Port, D Port) are the same, that is the same a ack event is alerted multiple times. b) (AttackT pe, S IP, D IP, S Port) is the same, an a acker scans the ports of another host and queries the services it runs. c) (AttackT pe, S IP) is the same, D IP is on the same network segment, and an a acker scans the target network segment to query the surviving hosts.
d) e AttackT pe is di erent, S IP and D IP are same,that is belongs to the springboard a ack.
By merging multiple alerts caused by the same security event into one alert record, the alert aggregation can greatly reduce the number of raw alerts and reduce the number of alerts to be associated, which can greatly reduce the time required for alert correlation. e complexity of the resulting multi-stage a ack model is greatly reduced. It is more conducive to us to explore the phenomenon of "Feint A ack".
We de ned the Alert Aggregation Rate as follows:
Alert A re ation Rate = Raw Alerts − Output Alerts Raw Alerts
Attribute Similarity Calculation • A ack Event e a ack events in the IDS alerts are classi ed based on the IKC model. From the a acker's point of view, the a acks in the subsequent stages are more complex and more purposeful, and the acquired rights are higher.
In the a ack event dimension, the similarity formula for a i , a j belonging to an a ack sequence is as follows:
Indicates the stage where the a i a ack event is located, indicating the di erence between the two alarms. If the alarm is 0 or 1, the greater the similarity, the smaller the similarity is. e upper limit of similarity is 1, and the minimum is 0.
• IP Address We use the method of comparing the same number of bits of an IP address to measure the similarity of IP addresses.
where N = max {H (a i .sIP, a j .dIP), H (a i .sIP, a j .sIP), H (a i .dIP, a j .dIP)} • Port e maximum value of the port is 65535, so the port di erence value can be normalized to represent.
• Timestamp In a multi-stage a acking process, the time interval is relatively short when two a acks are in the same phase, and the time interval may be longer when two a acks occur in di erent phases, and when there is a long latency following the previous access. For this reason, we do not set time window for alert logs. e similarity function of the timestamp property is as follows:
e complete similarity is calculated using the following function:
δ is the weight of the a ribute value.
Scan the alert sets a er aggregating, analyze each alert a i in turn, and calculate the membership degree of each classi ed result of a i . e speci c calculation method is to calculate the similarity function of all alerts in a i and a cluster. e maximum degree of similarity is used as the membership of this class of a i . Before calculating the similarity, rst determine the a ack event of the alert with the latest timestamp in the cluster and the a ack event of a i , whether the number of stages corresponding to the a ack event of the la er is less than the number of stages corresponding to the a ack event of the former is greater than or equal to -1, if it is greater than or equal to -1, we calculate the similarity of two alerts using a similarity function with multidimensional a ributes. If less than -1, we calculate the membership of a i belonging to the next cluster. e largest membership degree of a i belonging to the existing clusters is r . When r is greater than the threshold value λ, it is considered that the alerts in the clusters corresponding to the alerts a i and r are triggered by the same a ack process. If r is less than the threshold value λ, a i is used as a new cluster, which may be the beginning of a new a ack process. e speci c algorithm is described as follows:
Algorithm: Fuzzy Clustering Algorithm Process
Input: Alerts = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n }, and a ack sequence set
where each a ack sequence AS i =< a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n >. 1 For each raw alert a i , calculate its membership to each a ack sequence AS i . If the a ack sequence set ASS = {AS 1 , AS 2 , ..., AS q } is empty, then make AS 1 = {a i }, and repeat step 1 . If ASS is not empty, then use AS 1 in the ASS set in step 2 .
2 Scan a ack sequence AS i =< a 1 , a 2 , ..., a k >. First determine whether the phase of AS i (the phase in which the latest timestamp in AS i occurs). If the answer is yes, go to step 3 , and if the answer is no, then go to step 4 .
3 Calculate the similarity between a i and each element in AS i separately using the similarity function and use the maximum value of the results as a membership degree of a i to AS i . If the membership degree is greater than or equal to the preset threshold value λ, then add a i to a ack sequence AS i = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a k , a i } and go to step 4 . 4 Take the next AS i in ASS, if it exists, repeat step 2 ; if not, it means that all the a ack sequences in the ASS have been scanned. If the membership degree of a i to every a ack sequence is less than λ, then create a new element AS r = {a i } and add AS r to ASS = {AS 1 , AS 2 , ..., AS q , AS r }, before going to step 5 .
5 Repeat step 1 to step 4 zbove until all Alerts are analyzed. A virtual attack is de ned as an a ack that is accurately identi ed by IDS or an a ack classi er. A real a ack is a more concealed a ack (which may be a normal behavior) or a new type of a ack. e IDS does not generate an alert or is judged to be a normal behavior by the classi er.
Building the Virtual-Real Lib
e input to this section is the CICIDS2017 dataset, which has 83 statistical features such as duration, number of packets, number of bytes, packet length and so on. e output is the classi cation result of the a ack, which lays the foundation for the next step of dividing the virtual a acks and real a acks. It mainly studies existing a ack detection algorithms and improves traditional deep learning methods for a ack detection. Based on deep learning and few-shot deep learning algorithms, the raw alerts are preprocessed by unbalanced learning strategies, such as random downsampling and SMOTE oversampling techniques, combined with deep convolutional neural networks to select dataset features, and then through hierarchical SVM classi ers to build the optimal CICIDS2017 classi er. e network structure is shown in Table 1 . e results of CICIDS2017 classi er are ltered, and to enhance the con dence of the virtual a acks and real a acks, we selected the a acks that were judged to be omissive judgement in ten tests, that is, the a ack events identi ed as normal events as real a ack sample set. e correctly classi ed a ack events are used as a set of virtual a ack samples. e virtual a acks and real a acks are respectively extracted from the original dataset and store them in the le to form a virtual a ack and real a ack sample database, that is, the basic element library of the a ack chain construction, we de ned the concept of the virtual reality a ack con dence as the probability virtual a ack and real a ack samples are judged as normal event. e lower the probability value of the virtual a ack, the greater the probability that the a ack is a virtual a ack, and the high probability value of the real a ack indicates that the a acker is more likely to be a acked by the a acker. e division of virtual a acks and real a acks is shown in Table 2 . e red background in the table is real a acks, and the blue background is virtual a acks. Over-Sampling: SMOTE Less class-sample combining oversampling technique referred to as SMOTE algorithm, it is by Chawla.N [19] , who proposed one based on the traditional method of oversampling li le wood class like a simple copy of the di erent new oversampling. In the training data S, x i is the minority samples. e rst step to calculate the x i similar k-nearest neighbor set P i . From P i random selection of a sample, it may be set to x a , the di erence between the x i and x a corresponding to the a ribute q is denoted as di f f (q) = x aq − x iq . It can be concluded that the synthesis of minority class of sample f iq mathematical expressions is such as 7.
where rand (0,1) is expressed the random number in (0,1) . en the operation of the above process is repeated according to the beginning of the set of over sampling rate, and the synthesis of a new minority sample is added to the initial training sample to increase the number of minority samples. And the degree of imbalance will greatly reduce and get the new training samples, then there is basic balance between majority classes and minority classes in the new training data set. get the new training sample multi class sample and small sample in the number of basic balance. Finally, the new training data set are classi ed by the classi er and the results are obtained. e process is shown in Figure 2 . 1) e a acker hides the a ack trajectory, and sometimes uses the method of "make a feint to the east but a ack in the west" to perform a large number of a acks on the vital host A, such as DDoS a acks, generating a large number of alerts, while the real target host is B.
e operation and maintenance personnel handle the DDoS for A. A acks against B when the a ack does not take into account other alerts;
2) e a acker uses a highly concealed a ack in some steps of the multi-stage a ack sequence, or uses an advanced a ack to prevent the IDS system from generating an alert to confuse the operation and maintenance personnel. e lack of some processes in the multistage a ack process, resulting in the inability to completely restore the entire a ack path (such as using DNS queries in LLDoS2.0 instead of IPsweep in LLoS1.0).
Our a ack chain recovery technique which based on Bi-RNN. We use the a ack chain established in the rst stage and the real a ack in the second stage to embed the atomic a ack event into the a ack chain through Bi-RNN coding to construct the a ack chain.
e forward RNN records the information of the a ack chain from the cause and the result, and the reverse RNN records the information of the a ack chain from the result to the cause to ensure the maximum retention of the correlation information. e process is shown in Figure 3 . Finally, we label the sample set of feint a ack and non-feint a ack chains, and further classify the a ack chain samples. Based on the machine learning algorithm, a special a ack detection model based on the virtual a ack and real a ack chain is constructed by training the feint a ack and non-feint a ack chain samples, and the model parameters for the data set are determined. Further, the learning model integration of speci c weight enhancement is carried out by voting method to improve the accuracy of model detection. Finally, we achieve the purpose of accurately identifying the "Feint A ack".
EXPERIMENTAL AND RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the experiment results and give a comprehensive evaluation of bidirectional RNN-based few-shot training for detecting multi-stage a ack model proposed in this paper.
Experimental Setup

A. Experimental Environment
We choose same hardware and so ware con gurations when carrying out the experiments. Our experiment is conducted on the operating system of windows 10 on the hardware environment Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7500U CPU, 8GB RAM and IT hard disk. We utilize the programming language python 3.5. It can be found the main items of our hardware and so ware con guration in Table 3 .
e network topology of DARPA2000 is shown in the following Figure 4 , where the network is divided into DMZ network and Inside network. 
B. Experimental Data
Algorithm: "Feint A acks" Construction and Detection Model Input: the CICIDS2017 dataset Output: the classi er of the "feint a ack" chain
Step 1: Create CNN-SVM model 1 1. Add 1 st and 2 nd convolution layers with 32 lters of 3×3, followed by max pooling layer of size 2×2. 2. Add 3 r d and 4 th convolution layers with 64 lters of 3×3, followed by a en layer and the out put of which is a temp vector of 1600×1. 3. Add fully connected to get a vector(512×1), followed by a H-SVMs classi er.
Step 2: Build the Virtual-Real Lib
For ten times of test in model 1 I f a a ack is predicted to be Normal add the a ack with the probability of Normal to Real Lib Else i f a a ack is predicted correctly add the a ack with the probability of Normal to Virtual Lib Sort Real Lib and Virtual Lib by probability in ascending and descending order
Step 3: Create Bi-RNN model 2
1. Create a causal correlation matrix. 2. Construct a ack chains based on the matrix. 3. Encode the a ack chain using Bi-RNN. e DARPA2000 dataset is a collection of intrusion scenario correlations from MIT Lincoln lab. It is widely used to verify the effectiveness of various alert event correlation algorithms. LLDOS1.0 includes a complete distributed deny service (DDOS) a ack scenario, the multi-stage a ack consists of 5 steps. Detect, hack, install trojan mstream DDoS programs and perform remote DDoS a acks on target servers. e a ack process is shown in Figure 5 . e a ack mainly utilizes the bu er over ow vulnerability of the sadmind program on the solaris platform. As long as the a acker can correctly nd out and overwrite the stack of the executing sadmind program, the a acker can successfully invade the host and obtain the manager from the remote. Permission to execute arbitrary program code, including installing DDoS so ware and launching DDoS a acks. • Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset [CICIDS2017]:
e Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity published the CICIDS2017 dataset in 2017. e advantage of this data: time is near, the benchmark data set covers the 11 criteria required, and all previous IDS data sets cannot cover all 11 standards. Containing benign tra c and the latest common a acks, the data capture period begins at 9 am on Monday, July 3, 2017 and ends at 5 pm on Friday, July 7, 2017 for a total of 5 days. Monday is a normal day and only includes benign tra c. A acks implemented include brute force FTP, brute force SSH, DoS, Heartbleed, web a ack, in ltration, botnet and DDoS. ey are executed on Tuesday, Wednesday, ursday and Friday.
C. Evaluation Criteria ere are many evaluation indicators used in intrusion detection systems. Although this paper only studies the multi-stage a ack identi cation, it also uses the commonly used indicators in the intrusion detection eld, namely the completeness rate and accuracy. Suppose the total number of a acks included in the test data set is N , the number of a acks identi ed by the recognition method is RN , and the number of a acks identi ed in these test data sets is actually R. e de nitions of these indicators are as follows:
1) Completeness Rate: e completeness rate is the completeness of the description method, that is, whether all a acks can be found. e calculation method for multi-stage a ack recognition completeness rate is:
Completeness Rate = R/N (8) 2) Accuracy Rate: Accuracy rate is the correctness of the description method, that is, how many of the identi ed a acks are correct.
e calculation method for multi-stage a ack recognition accuracy is:
Experimental Result and Evaluation
A. Alert Correlation Based on Fuzzy Clustering
Use the snort's command sudo snort -r /LLS DDOS 1.0-inside. dump -l /home -A fast -c /etc/snort/snort.conf in Linux to replay the original tra c packets from LLDoS1.0 and LLDoS2.0 of DARPA2000 and CICIDS2017. en, we got the raw alerts of snort in Figure 6 . rough the network tra c packet analysis so ware Wireshark, we analyzed all tra c packets (including normal background tra c) in the DMZ and Inside areas of LLoS1.0, and the packets containing only a ack tra c in each of the ve a ack phases of the DDoS a ack.
e analysis results are shown in Figure 7 . We tracked the TCP ow of the key a ack steps and saw that the a acker performed a large number of IP sweep (ICMP echo request) on the target network segment, among which 18 hosts survived (ICMP echo reply). e next step is Sadmind ping, querying the Sadmind vulnerability and verifying that the service is running on the surviving host. ere are 6 hosts that meet this condition. Bu er over ow a acks on these 6 hosts invaded the host, and 3 hosts successfully invaded, namely: 172. 16 Using the fuzzy clustering algorithm proposed in Section 3.1, 3222 alerts are clustered, and a total of 944 a ack sequences are obtained. It contains a large number of sequences of length 1 (indicating that there are a large number of fragmentation alerts in the alert clustering). BAD-TRAFFIC loopback tra c A er deleting the sequence of length 1, a total of 195 multi-stage a ack sequences are obtained. A er extracting the multi-stage a ack mode, nine sequence pa erns are obtained. Among them, the alerts including the multi-stage a ack process in LLDOS1.0 are shown in the following Table 5 . It can be concluded that the a ack route is composed of three independent paths in Figure 8 .
B. Building the Virtual-Real Lib By using the downsampling and SMOTE algorithms, the number of our data sets becomes as shown in Table 6 . e model using only CNN and using few-shot deep learning model are shown in the Figure 9 . It can be seen that CNN is easy to cause over-ing, and the model of few-shot deep learning is used to avoid over-ing.
e result of few-shot deep learning model is shown in Table 7 . We can see that our method has signi cantly improved the detection rate of Minority class-sample (U2R and R2L). We nd the fact that CNN-SVM with SMOTE get the best recall and precision. CNN model without SMOTE has lower recall when the classify U2R and R2L tra c. e reason of that the amount of U2R and R2L packages is too lower than other packages what we have mentioned above. But the recall to U2R and R2L tra c has been greatly improved by introduced SMOTE. e result can be seen in Figure 10 . e evaluation criteria of the number of iterations is shown in Figure 11 .
e Virtual-Real Lib contains 20,718 real a acks and 189,826 virtual a acks. In order to verify the reliability of our results, we got all of real a acks and Normal to test, the results show that more than 99% of the real a acks are missed as normal.
C. Build Feint Lib and Detect the "Feint A ack" Figure 11 : e e ect of the number of iterations on the experimental results.
Feint Lib contains 11758 records of "Feint A ack" chains, and there has 20 a acks in each record. e number of training sets is 9408 and the number of testing sets is 2350. e dataset can be seen in Figure 12 . Label 1 means the chain is a "Feint A ack" chain. Label 0 means the chain is a common chain. e number of real a acks in the a ack chain are 1 to 7. Among them, the number of a ack chains containing one real a ack is 3371, the number of a ack chains containing two real a acks is 3248, the number of a ack chains containing three real a acks is 1811, the number of a ack chains containing four real a acks is 672, the number of a ack chains containing ve real a acks is 200, the number of a ack chains containing six real a acks is 50, the number of a ack chains containing seven real a acks is 11, and the number of a ack chains containing eight real a acks is one.
Finally, we chose best c = 0.5 and best =1 to get the best acc = 78.8764% of cross validation. We got 75.23% accuracy on the test set. It is shown in Figure 13 . 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, aiming at the "Feint A ack" mode in APT a ack, we proposed new detection method which mainly utilizes fuzzy clustering and Bi-RNN algorithm. Firstly, by analyzing the existing "Feint A ack", we de ned virtual a acks and real a acks as the basic a ack events that constitute the "Feint A ack" chain. In the a ack scenario, the fuzzy clustering method based on a ribute similarity is used to mine multi-stage a ack chains. A multi-stage a ack mode comparison library is formed, and a few-shot deep learning model is de ned and divided into virtual a acks and real a acks to construct a dataset of atomic a ack events. en, the atomic a ack event is embedded into the a ack chain through Bi-RNN coding, and the "Feint A ack" chain is constructed to form the "Feint A ack" dataset. Finally, the a ack chain samples containing the feint a ack behavior and the non-feint a ack behavior are further classi ed to achieve the purpose of accurately identifying the "Feint A ack". Our innovation lies in the rst use of bidirectional RNN coding to construct the a ack chain to ensure maximum retention of causal information. We veri ed our method by using the LLDoS1.0 and LLDoS2.0 of DARPA2000 and CICIDS2017 of Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity. e experimental results show that our method can derive the multi-stage a ack sequence from the alert correlation by fuzzy clustering, and the "Feint A ack" behavior is mined from the a ack chains. e a ack sequence is encoded by Bi-RNN, and achieve 75.23% accuracy to identify "Feint A ack".Research on the key technologies of behavior detection, and realize the prototype system based on the virtual a ack and real a ack chain to achieve zero breakthrough in detecting such a acks.
